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What is the appropriate relationship between the fields of  language and social 
interaction (LSI) research and cognitive psychology?   I wish to speculate about one possible 
future where LSI hijacks much of the action which would have been considered the province 
of cognitive psychology, respecifying and reorienting it as it does so.  In this future LSI 
becomes a foundational discipline in the social sciences rather than existing merely to service 
one of a wide array of different topic areas.  It is a future of ambition and creative argument.  
LSI might need a name change, though. 
 
TWO MODELS OF LSI 
 
Let me start by distinguishing between two extreme models of LSI and its relationship 
to other areas of social science.  On the one hand, there is a model in which social life is an 
array of intersecting modules and levels and the different social sciences sub-fields study 
these different modules and levels to improve understanding.  They provide complementary 
analyses of topics such as semantics, registers, cognitive representations and ideology which 
can be articulated together to contribute to a larger picture.  Here the field is defined by topic 
rather than by method or theory.  This model of LSI is presented in both the introduction and 
the organization of Teun van Dijk's (1997) (excellent) volumes on discourse studies.  I will 
call this the Complementary Model of LSI. 
On the other hand, there is a model of the relationship between LSI and other areas of 
social science which, instead of offering complementary analyses, proposes instead a 
wholesale respecification of topics, methods and questions.  Ethnomethodological 
conversation analysis is one perspective in LSI which is characterised by the respecification 
of a wide range of social science notions; post-structuralism offers another perspective calling 
for a root and branch disciplinary overhaul.  For example, in conversation analysis, the 
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attempt is not to relate institutions, as prior existing and clearly identifiable phenomena, with 
the more ephemeral waxing and waning of talk; rather institutional realities are treated as 
constituted in talk in a variety of ways as participants construct and orient to institutional 
goals and identities (Drew & Sorjonen, 1997; Heritage 1997).  I will call this the 
Respecification Model of LSI. 
Quite apart from any theoretical and analytic grounds for preferring one model over 
another, the Respecification Model has the virtue of promoting potentially productive debate 
across the social sciences.  So far, this model has had its most powerful effects in sociology, 
where ethnomethodological conversation analysis has developed a radically different 
approach to issues of social structure.  However, there has, as yet, been relatively little 
argument at the intersection of LSI and cognitive psychology.   
 
DISCOURSE AND COGNITION  
 
The boundary of LSI and cognitive psychology has been colonised by the thriving 
research tradition of discourse processes (‘discourse’ signalled linguistic issues that go 
beyond the sentence; ‘processes’ suggested that these issues might be dealt with by cognitive 
processes of one kind or another). The Complementary Model is at work here to sustain a 
seamless transition between cognitive psychology and LSI research with the boundary area 
covered by ROLSI’s sister journal Discourse Processes, by the sorts of social cognition work 
(in speech accommodation and so on) published in the Journal of Language and Social 
Psychology, and by the various books in the Advances in Discourse Processes series.   
In the Respecification Model things are more complicated.  There has been a tradition 
of Wittgenstein influenced critique of cognitivism in ethnomethodology for some time 
(Button, et al., 1995; Coulter, 1990).  Although much of this was a conceptual reworking of 
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Wittgensteinian notions in the light of ethnomethodological thinking, it also spawned Lucy 
Suchman’s influential work.  Suchman challenged the traditional cognitive psychology of 
goals and plans by highlighting the interactional uses of plans when using and maintaining a 
photocopier –plans served a normative role in justifying conduct but did not explain, let alone 
causally constrain, the sorts of ad hoc situated practices involved in running the copier 
(Suchman, 1987).   
Conversation analysts have had an ambivalent response to cognition.  Some have 
expressed considerable caution about taking cognitivist notions such as strategies at face 
value (Heritage, 1990/1), while others have argued that some kind of cognitive notions are 
inescapable in conversation analytic work, so it is important to deal with them clearly and 
explicitly (Pomerantz, 1990/1).  This ambivalence is picked up in analytic practice.  Some 
conversation analytic research has reworked cognitivist notions in terms of conversational 
routines.  An example of this is Emanuel Schegloff’s (1992) transformation of the notion of 
intersubjectivity from a phenomenological merging of consciousness into a set of interaction 
procedures involving the management of repair.  Other research has taken cognitivist notions 
as an unproblematic start point for research.  For example, Paul Drew (1995) seems happy to 
do business with the idea of ‘anticipatory interactive planning’. 
Why has there been this difference in approach to social structure and cognition?  It 
may be because conversation analysis has its origins and much of its disciplinary base in 
sociology.  Conversation analysts have rethought social structure as they have been forced to 
deal with sociology’s dominant conceptions of society and to counter mainsteam attacks on 
their legitimacy.  In contrast, conversation analysts have found cognitive psychology to be a 
rather distant discipline, and a discipline, moreover, which has almost entirely ignored it.  
When cognitive psychologists have wanted to understand language and interaction they have 
almost invariably looked to the sorts of pragmatic work characteristic of the discourse 
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processes tradition (although Clark, 1992, is a rare exception).  There is something of the 
reverse pattern where a respecification model of discourse analysis developed psychology. 
 
DISCOURSE ANALYSIS AND DISCURSIVE PSYCHOLOGY 
  
Traditionally LSI work in social psychology was cognitivist, and strongly influenced 
by what, in North America anyway, became the dominant social cognition tradition by the 
start of the 1990s.  In Britain in particular a type of discourse analysis emerged in social 
psychology under the influence of a mixture of conversation analysis, post-structuralism and 
rhetoric (Billig, 1987; Potter and Wetherell, 1987).  This was very much within the 
Respecification Model of LSI, fundamentally transforming the social cognitivist assumptions 
of social psychology.   
Consider the example of attitudes.  Traditional social psychologists theorized attitudes 
as underlying mental constructs which influence ‘behaviour’ and can be used to index how 
one individual differs from another.  Discourse researchers have criticised this notion on both 
analytic and conceptual grounds, moving the focus on to people’s heterogeneous practices of 
evaluation in particular settings (Potter, 1998).  The notion of practice is crucial here – the 
concern is what is being done with evaluations rather than their role as evidence of putative 
underlying explanatory entities. 
Over the past few years this kind of respecifying critique has been developed beyond 
the sub discipline of social psychology, and in 1997 Derek Edwards published a major work 
which drew out the implications of themes in the sociology of scientific knowledge and 
Harvey Sacks’ thinking for the prevailing cognitivist view of psychology (Edwards, 1997; 
see also, Edwards, 1995).   Edwards offers a sweeping reappraisal of the central thesaurus of 
cognitivist notions, including shared knowledge, scripts, categories, memory, emotion and 
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animal and child cognition.  Its vision is no less than a full scale discursive psychology.  For 
example, he takes the cognitivist construction of shared knowledge and shows the virtue – 
analytically and theoretically – of respecifying it in terms of practical, situated 
accomplishments in interaction; that is, of pragmatic intersubjectivity.  And he highlights the 
confused state of traditional research which has made judgements about shared knowledge 
from a range of more or less technical arenas of interaction without addressing the pragmatics 
of intersubjectivity.  
Reworking cognitive psychology in this way has a range of methodological 
implications.  The most notable is that is provides a principled, theoretically grounded reason 
for addressing topics that were previously dealt with in exclusively cognitivist terms by 
focusing on action.  Rather than concentrating on putative inner entities and processes that 
might be occurring within an actor abstracted from action and interaction, the interest is in 
how cognitive notions are constructed, managed and oriented to in action.  Discursive 
psychologists ask: what does the notion of memory do in some interaction?  How is a version 
of the past constructed to sustain some action?  The overwhelming practice of cognitive 
psychology involves abstracting the person from interaction as far as possible.  In discursive 
psychology, interaction becomes a, perhaps the, fundamental site for studying (a respecified) 
cognition.  Put another way, rather than LSI being a rather marginal subfield of cognitive 
psychology, cognitive psychology becomes a subfield of LSI. 
 
COGNITION, REALITY AND CONSTRUCTIONISM 
 
One of the phenomena highlighted in discursive psychological research is the close 
interrelationship between constructions of cognitive entities of various kinds and 
constructions of the world (see Edwards, 1997; Edwards & Potter, 1992; Potter, 1996).  
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Versions of ‘inner states’ can be part of establishing consequential ‘facts’ about the world.  
Thus, characterising someone as ‘sceptical’ may cast their version of the world as cautious 
but potentially believable; characterising a person as ‘jealous’ can suggest distortions in his 
account of his relationship.  Conversely, particular descriptions of ‘external reality’ can be 
part of established consequential ‘facts’ about inner states.  Describing a woman as ‘flirting’ 
can sustain a very different motivational story to  ‘just messin’’. 
I am making two points here.  First, it is possible – and fruitful – to study the business 
done by descriptions as they appear in various kinds of interaction.  Second, when we 
consider practices of talk, the boundary between what is cognitive and what is not is 
particularly permeable.  LSI research need not start from the assumption that there must be 
consequential differences between descriptions of events, social institutions, or cognitive 
entities.  The territorial boundaries of cognition, social structure, action and so on reflect a 
history of disciplinary colonisation.  We have the opportunity to tear up the old maps.  At the 
same time, there has been a flood of work in the last decade that dubs itself ‘constructionist’.  
Often what is being suggested by the construction metaphor is not clear – what precisely is 
constructed, and how?  As I have argued at length (Potter, 1996), constructionism can be 
given a coherent focus by considering how descriptions are constructed, how they are made 
factual and what sorts of practices they are involved with.  Constructionism, too, could be 
given an LSI makeover. 
 
LANGUAGE AND SOCIAL INTERACTION AFTER THE CENTURY’S TURN  
 
I have tried to outline a vision of the future of LSI which makes it a central, perhaps 
foundational, discipline in the social sciences.  I have tried to promote the respecification 
model, and push it to extreme.  In particular, I have wanted to show how a discursive 
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psychology can build on existing developments to provide a productive alternative to 
traditional cognitivist cognitive psychology.  At the same time, it can provide a coherent 
focus for the heterogeneous and theoretically fragmented work of constructionism.  This 
vision is an ambitious one, and there is a huge amount of disciplinary inertia in the way of its 
realization.  However, merely having the arguments could generate rich new thinking. 
What sort of work would realize this vision?  In methodological terms, it would 
primarily consist in studies of records (audio and video) of ‘natural’ interaction, where 
natural means that the interaction was not got up by the researcher in one way or another.  
That means that it would be overwhelmingly non-experimental (not just because of the well 
established problems in the critiques of positivism, but because of their patent failure of deal 
with the reflexive and indexical nature of interaction), and would generally avoid the sorts of 
interview studies that have been popular in constructionist research (because of their slide 
into cognitivism, their peculiar interactional status, and their imposition of social science 
agendas on participants – see Widdicombe and Wooffitt, 1995).  It would probably look most 
similar to the burgeoning CA based work on talk and institutions (Drew and Heritage, 1992), 
although here the primary focus would not be on how institutions are constituted and oriented 
to, but on how mind and reality are simultaneously managed in particular settings.   
There is already high quality work starting to paint in the detail of this vision.  Take 
two ‘psychological’ topics: counselling and perception.  Annsi Peräkylä (1995) has studied 
the production of HIV+ counselling as a practice and an institution, while at the same time 
considering how the participants construct their worlds and their mental life.  Derek Edwards 
(1995) considered the way couples in relationship counselling produce versions of their own, 
and their partner’s, problems in a way that managed issues of blame and therapeutic outcome.  
These studies are exemplary, and also illustrate the convergence of work in conversation 
analysis and discursive psychology.  If counselling is an obvious focus for LSI work beyond 
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cognitivism, the topic of perception is something of a hard case.  It is not easy to think of a 
less obviously discursive topic.  Nevertheless, in a series of major studies Charles and 
Marjorie Goodwin (Goodwin, 1995, 1997; Goodwin & Goodwin, 1996, 1997) have shown 
how perception can be treated not as an inner psychological phenomenon, but as a feature of 
situated practices where airline workers, chemists and oceanographers have to ‘see’ particular 
planes, color changes in reactions, or features of the ocean floor.  These studies start to show 
how that perception is produced in interaction. 
Research on Language and Social Interaction is a journal that can be at the heart of 
these developments.  My preference would be for its name not to be taken too seriously, 
though.  Part of the task of the respecification model is to trouble both the notion of language 
as an abstract system, separable from practices, and the notion of social interaction, with its 
micro-sociology, leave the big stuff to the social theorists, overtones.  A vibrant LSI should 
not be closed to issues of ideology (Billig, 1992) and social critique (Kitzinger and Frith, in 
press) and new ways of addressing these issues have been developed.  Luckily names don’t 
have to be taken too seriously – Dartmouth (in Devon, not Kansas or Nova Scotia!) still 
names the town successfully even though the mouth of the river is now some way away. 
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